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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PAUL F. WALDEN.
Plaintiff.
Case No. 890282-CA
vs.
Classification No. 6
S.M.P. TRUCKING and/or ROYAL
INSURANCE and THE EMPLOYERS1
REINSURANCE FUND.
Defendants.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS1 REINSURANCE FUND

I.

JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
U.C.A. Section 78-2a-3 (2) (a).

II.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This action is an appeal from a decision rendered by the
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah on April 18. 1989.

III.
(1)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether

the Employers1

Reinsurance Fund's Motion for

Review was timely filed?
(2)

Whether

there

is evidence

in the

record

to

support

the Commission's Findings and Order that plaintiff's permanent total
disability rate must be based on the rate applicable on the date of
plaintiff's 1976 injury on which plaintiff was rendered permanently
and totally disabled.
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On

August

25,

1976,

plaintiff's

forklift

overturned,

resulting in severe left ankle fracture requiring perhaps as many as
13 surgeries and ultimately resulting in a rating of 85% permanent
partial impairment of the left foot at the ankle for which payment
was

ordered

by

the

Industrial

Commission

on 2/8/81

(R.46, 47).

Following numerous other medical referrals, including treatment for
severe

depression

and

suicide

ruminations

(R.49),

and

the

termination of compensation payments from the August 25, 1976 ankle
fracture

injury, plaintiff

benefits

from

the

Reinsurance Fund),
orthopedic

applied for permanent total disability

Second

Injury

Fund

(now

called

Employers1

A letter dated November 10, 1981 by plaintiff's

treating

Surgeon,

following diagnoses:

John

P.

Mendenhall,

contained

the

(R.53)

(1) Fused left wrist; (2) osteoarthritis right wrist with
ununited fractured scaphoid and spontaneous inner carpal
fusions; (3) status post operative fusion L-4 to the
sacrum
with
severe
osteoarthritis;
(4)
early
osteoarthritis
left hip;
(5) status post operative
arthrodesis left ankle with incomplete fusion.
And further: Mr. Walden is totally disabled due to the
above listed orthopedic problems.
Following

the receipt

of

the above medical report, the

Industrial Commission, through Joseph C. Foley, Admininistrative Law
Judge, on November 25, 1981, placed plaintiff on the permanent and
total disability payroll of the Second Injury Fund effective May 29,
1981.

Plaintiff

has

been

receiving

permanent

total

disability

benefits since that date.
Even

after

the

above

determination,

the

record

shows

additional ankle fusion as of April 17, 1985 on plaintiff's left
side indicating that "he has had 38 surgical procedures" with
3

respect

to

that

ankle

injury.

(R.84)

Also

of

interest

and

pertinent to plaintiff's pre-existing overall disability, the record
shows a slip and fall injury in May, 1984 while at a K-Mart Store,
which
also

resulted
a

in right

personal

knee

injury

surgery

law

suit

in October

by plaintiff

1984

(R.74). and

against

the K-Mart

Store.
Alleged industrial injury of September 17, 1985.
Notwithstanding all of the regognized severe and disabling
conditions above referred
truck

driving

industrial
September

job

and

incident
17,

to, plaintiff, in August, 1985, secured a

had

giving

1985,

the

been
rise

record

working

only

when

the

to this controversy

occurred.

On

shows

plaintiff

was

(R.386)

26

days

that

tightening a boom on a trailer when his right hand slipped and he
struck his wrist on the edge of the trailer.

When the wrist pain

did not respond to initial treatment, plaintiff on November 27. 1985
underwent

a

successful

preoperative

diagnosis

osteoarthritis

of

the

total
was

wrist

listed

wrist".

arthroplasty

(R.96)

This

as

(R.96-98).

"severe

diagnosis

was

The

degenerative

repeated

later

when plaintiff's right wrist was fused (R.107).
Of
Whom

It

additional

May

Concern

medical
letter

Surgeon, Devon A. Nelson,
don't

think

evaluation

that
done

deteriorated,
above

he

problems."

interest
written

on August

and
by

significance
plaintiff's

11, 1986

(R.105).

the patient's status has improved
by

Dr.

Mendenhall.

continues
On

to

be

November

In

fact,

completely
21,

1988,

is a To

orthopedic
stating

"I

since the 1981

if

any,

disabled
Gilbert

due

he

has

to

the

Martinez,

Administrative Law Judge issued Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law
4

and

Order

allowing

attributable

to

plaintiff's

September

permanent

17.

1985

total

disability

industrial

claim

incident

but

permitting the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to offset temporary total
disability
time

the

plaintiff

payments

made

Employers1
pursuant

by the carrier

Reinsurance

Fund

to plaintiff's

resulting

from

his

defendant

Employers'

1976

was

filed

the same

payments

to

total disability award

injury.

Fund

at

continuing

permanent

industrial

Reinsurance

to plaintiff

Both
with

plaintiff
the

and

Industrial

Commission Motions for Review of the Findings and Order made by the
Administrative
temporary

Law

Judge.

Plaintiff

total disability

payments

granting of new permanent

objected

and

to

defendant

the

offset

objected

of

to the

total disability benefits arising out of

the September 17. 1985 industrial incident.
The full Commission reviewed the entire file including the
entire medical files on plaintiff, and on April 18, 1989 issued its
unanimous Order granting both Motions for Review.
the

Commission

reinstated

plaintiff's

based

the 1976 industrial

disability

award

same

disallowed

time

upon
any

offset

for

In other words,

earlier

permanent

total

injury and at the

temporary

total

disability

payments received by plaintiff as a result of his September 17. 1985
injury.
Plaintiff

on

May

10.

1989

filed

with

this

Court

his

Petition of Appeal.

VI.
(1)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Defendant's Motion for Review was timely filed and in

compliance with the Industrial Commission. Industrial Accident
5

Rule R490-1-4. pertaining

to the filing of responses to notices or

Orders issued or otherwise served by mail.
(2)
support

the

permanent

There

is

substantial

Commission's

factual

evidence

in

determination

the
that

record

to

plaintiff's

total disability was caused by his pre-existing

injuries

and other conditions and not by the alleged injury of September 17.
1985.

VII.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR REVIEW WAS TIMELY FILED.
Contrary
governing

the

to

plaintiff's

assertions,

filing

of

defendant's

Motion

Industrial

Commission

in

this

The

35-1-82.51

U.C.A.,

was

case.

repealed

there
for

Review

former

effective

is no

with

Statute.

January

statute
the

Section

1. 1988.

This

left in its stead Section 35-1-82.53 as amended effective April 25.
1988. to read as follows:
35-1-82.53.
Review of Administrative's
of Commission's Order.

Order

- finality

(1) Any party and interest who is dissatisfied with the
Order entered by an Administrative Law Judge may seek
review of that Order with the Commission by complying with
the Commission's rules governing that review.
(2) The Order of the Commission on review is final unless
set a side by the Court of Appeals.
Thus, the Industrial Commission

is permitted to establish

its own rules for the filing of a Motion Seeking Review of an Order
entered by an Administrative Law Judge.
November 21, 1988. contains the following:

In this case, the Order of

It is further Ordered that any Motions for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within 30 days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail, the particular errors
and objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be
final and not subject to review or appeal.
(R.530)
(R.531) was

That

mailed

to

Order
all

with

the

its

parties

Certificate
including

of

Mailing

the Employers1

Reinsurance Fund on November 21, 1988 by the Industrial Commission.
The Industrial Commission Allowance for Mailing under such
circumstances is set forth in its Rule #R490-l-4 - Allowance for
Mailing - which read as follows:
Whenever a notice or other paper requiring or permitting
some action on behalf of a party is served on a party by
mail, three (3) days shall be added to the prescribed
contained in these Rules or in the Workers* Compensation
Act.
The Industrial Commission found that the filing by this
defendant of its Motion for Review was within the specified thirty
(30) days plus three (3) days allowance and, therefore, held that
the Motion was timely filed.
clear

that

it

matters

not

Reference to the Rule will make it
what

method

of

filing

(by mail or

hand-delivery) is used by the person or party filing the Motion to
Review of
Judge.

the Order

It would

it has received from the Administrative Law

not make sense for

the Commission

to disallow

hand-delivery within the three (3) days period but permit a party to
file even a day after the hand-delivery so long as the response
reaches the Commission within the required thirty (30) days plus the
three (3) days allowance time.
The Retherford and Wickham cases referred to by plaintiff
deal with review by the Court of Appeals of Final Orders of the
Industrial Commission rather than review by the Industrial
7

Commission of an Order of the Administrative Law Judge which review
by Statute

is governed

by the Rules of the Industrial

Commission.

In addition, both of those cases arose prior to the repeal of the
Statutes

referred

to

above

which

prescribed

specific

time

limits

within which review by the Commission must be sought.

Instead, as

mentioned

appropriate

above,

responsibility

for

setting

the

procedures and time limits for the filing of Motion for Review now
is delegated

to the Commission

and,

in this

case, subject to the

application of Commission Rule #R490-l-4.
In
referred
filing

summary.

the

through

the

Statute

above

to has jurisdiction to determine the appropriate dates for

in this case and

Review

Commission

was

timely

is

its finding
supported

that defendant's Motions

by

the

Statute

and

by

for
the

Commission's rule with respect to such filing.
POINT II
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE
COMMISSION'S
FACTUAL
DETERMINATION
THAT
PLAINTIFF'S
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY WAS CAUSED BY HIS PRE-EXISTING
INJURIES AND OTHER CONDITIONS AND NOT BY THE ALLEGED
INJURY OF SEPTEMBER 17, 1985.
The
industrial
his

permanent

reinforced
from

total

and

conditions

disabled

the

Commission

found

that

plaintiff's

alleged

injury of September 17, 1985, did not cause or result in

permanently
and

Industrial

in

disability

totally
which

the

disabled
had

1981

1984

K-Mart

due

rendered

Order

by additional

because

of

impairment

injury

and

plaintiff

already

to the pre-existing
him

the

permanently
Industrial

and

injuries
totally

Commission,

as

to plaintiff's knees resulting
surgeries,

not

to

mention

additional right wrist impairment and surgeries which took place
8

was

the

prior to the industrial incident of September 17. 1985,
It is now well established Utah Compensation Law that it
is within

the

determine

the

sound

discretion

commencement

of

date

the Industrial

of benefits

for

Commission to

permanent

total

disability so long as the determination is supported by substantial
evidence

and

Commission,

not

735

patently

P.2d

665

unreasonable.

(Utah App.

1987).

Oman

the factual

findings

arbitrary and capricious).

of

Industrial

See also Entwistle

Company v. Wilkins. 626 P.2d 495. 498 (Utah 1981).
not overturn

v.

(This Court will

the Commission

unless they

It is also established Utah Compensation

Law that a claimant for permanent total disability benefits must
prove medically
accident.

that his disability was caused by his industrial

See Large v. Industrial Commission. 758 P.2d 954 (Utah

App. 1988). holding that where the permanent total disability is the
result of pre-existing conditions and not the industrial accident, a
claimant is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits from
that

industrial

Sheeting

accident.

Company.

717 P.2d

See also Hodges v. Western Piling and
718

(Utah 1986).

In this case, the

Commission found clearly that plaintiff's permanent total disability
was the result of his pre-existing conditions and not his industrial
accident of September 17, 1985.

It is this defendants contention

that the Commissions determination is well supported by substantial
evidence in this case.
conclusive.
disabled
incident.

that

prior

Indeed, the evidence is overwhelming, if not

plaintiff

was

clearly

permanently

to the time of his September

and

totally

17. 1985 industrial

Reference to the permanent total disability determination

by the Industrial Commission, through Administrative Law Judge,
9

Foley in 1981, supplemented
Mendenhall
indeed,

referred

was

by the clear cut medical report of Dr.

to above

permanently

(R.52)/ makes

and

totally

it clear that plaintiff

disabled

severe orthopedic problems as early as 1981.
was
slip

further
and

reinforced

fall

as a pre-existing

injury

with

K-Mart

in

as a result

This total disability

condition

1984

impairment and disability.

is

of

evidence

substantial

and

by

resulting

surgeries and additional
undisputed

of his

plaintiffs
in

multiple

Finally, there

significant

increased

right wrist problems and impairment beginning with plaintiff's right
wrist fracture in 1954 and continuing right up to the date of his
September

17,

1985,

alleged

industrial

incident.

A

summary

of

plaintiff's right wrist history is as follows:
(1) Right wrist fracture in 1954, at the age of 16 years
which was treated in the State of Oklahoma.
(2) On January 4, 1956, applicant sustained an industrial
injury to his right wrist while employed by Western Union
Services
in the State of Oklahoma.
Following this
industrial accident, applicant underwent surgery on his
right wrist, performed by Dr. John Ramsey in the State of
Oklahoma.
(3)
In
1972,
applicant
was
experiencing
pain and
discomfort
into his right wrist.
The applicant was
treated by Dr. Kezerian for significant loss of motion in
the right wrist.
In addition, plaintiff was treated by
Dr. Nathaniel Nord and Dr. Mark Greene.
(4) On June 15, 1972, plaintiff was involved in a second
industrial accident in the State of Utah involving his
right wrist.
It appears that he was employed by Strong
Construction Company at the time of this right wrist
injury.
(5) In 1975, Dr. Eugene Chapman recommended to plaintiff
that he undergo surgery on his right wrist.
(6)
Again, in 1976, Dr. Charles Smith indicated to
plaintiff that the arthritis into the right wrist was
increasing and that surgery was impossible method of
treatment.

10

(7) In 1981. plaintiff sustained an injury to his right
wrist at home. At that time, he injured his right wrist
when
he
fell
outside
his
bathtub.
Following
this
incident, plaintiff was treated by Dr. Devon Nelson. In
addition, in 1981. plaintiff underwent a fusion of the
right wrist as performed by Dr. John P. Mendenhall. In
1983. Dr. Mendenhall recommended that plaintiff undergo a
fusion of the right wrist.
On February 2, 1983. Dr.
Mendenhall
performed
a
carpal
tunnel
surgery
on
applicant's right wrist.
(8)
In 1984. Dr. Mendenhall treated plaintiff for a
severe problem in the right wrist.
At that time. Dr.
Mendenhall advised plaintiff to undergo further surgery on
his right wrist.
It

is apparent from the above that plaintiff's

permanent

total disability status began many years before the September. 1985
alleged

industrial

following

the

incident

Industrial

and

that

Commission's

not

only

did

permanent

it

total

continue

disability

Order of November. 1981 but it was indeed augmented by the serioqs
knee injury of May. 1984 requiring two surgeries and indeed also by
additional
wrist.

surgery

Thus,

and carpal tunnel surgery for plaintiff's right

it

is

plaintiff's permanent

clear

beyond

reasonable

question

that

total disability status was not caused by his

September 17. 1985. industrial incident but was in fact, totally due
to injuries and conditions which preceded that industrial incident.
Indeed,

it appears from the full medical records that the incident

of September. 1985 was not even a major contributor to plaintiff's
right wrist

problems which began at least 20 years ago and became

increasingly more severe right up to the date of the injury now in
controversy.
It
determination

apparent
was

from

the

supported

above

that
by

the

Commission's

substantial-indeed

overwhelming-evidence and therefore, was neither arbitrary.

11

capricious nor patently unreasonable.
The

Commission

having

made

the

proper

factual

determination that plaintiff's permanent total disability was caused
by

conditions

industrial

and

injuries

incident

1985 occasion,

and

not

pre-existing

the

by the striking

of

September^

1985

his wrist on that

then applied, correctly and properly, the rationale

of the Robert Large v. Industrial Commission, decision of this Court
found in 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988).

In that case, as here, the

Commission found that the permanent total disability was the result
of

pre-existing

therefore,

conditions

the claimant

total disability

was

benefits

and

not

the

industrial

found not to be entitled

from

the

later

accident;

to permanent

industrial

accident.

In

the same vein is the Utah Supreme Court case of Hodges v. Western
Piling and Sheeting Company. 717 P.2d 718
defendant's
this

position

instance,
of

plaintiff

already
as

the

a

the

constitutes

rationale

disabled

that

Robert
has

result

determination
an

of

of

a. fortiori

Large Opinion,

been

(Utah 1986).

found

to

multiple

severe

the Commission

application

because
be

It is this

in this

permanently
injuries

of

the

instance,

and

and

in

totally

extensive

surgeries of an orthopedic nature and, further, even following that
permanent total disability determination had additional serious knee
injuries

and

additional surgeries on plaintiff's right wrist prior

to the September, 1985 alleged
to

support

even

further
entitled

incident.

the

plaintiff

is not

resulting

from his September,

All of the above combine

Commission's

to a permanent
1985

determination

that

total disability finding

right wrist

injury and further

that his permanent total disability properly is attributable to the
12

pre-existing injuries and conditions which formed the basis for the
initial permanent total disability award to plaintiff in 1981.

VIII.
1.

CONCLUSION

Defendant's Motion for Review was timely filed and in

compliance with the Utah Workers Compensation Act and particularly
with

the Industrial Commission Rule

#R490-l-4, pertaining to the

filing made in this instance.
2.

The

Commission's

factual

determination

that

plaintiff's permanent total disability was caused by injuries and
conditions

pre-existing

the

industrial

incident

of September 17,

1985 and not by that industrial injury is supported by substantial
evidence

in

the

record

and,

therefore,

was

not

arbitrary,

capricious, or unreasonable in the light of all the circumstances
and the history of this case.

Likewise, the Commission properly and

correctly applied the rationale of the recent decision of this Court
in the Robert Large v. Industrial Commission, supra, permanent total
disability case.
For

the

Reinsurance Fund
this

case

reasons

set

respectfully

be denied

and

forth

above,

defendant

Employers'

requests that plaintiff's appeal in

the Order

of

the Industrial

Commission

*rh

affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this/tr

13

. day of October, 1989.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of
Defendant's Brief were mailed this / if

day of October. 1989 to

the following:
Randy M. Lish
Attorney for Plaintiff
930 South State, Suite 10
Orem. Utah 84058
Henry K. Chai. II
Attorney for Defendant
SNOW. CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City. Utah 84145
(1 copy)

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

:ie V. Baxrfman, Administrator

— EXHIBIT I —

954

Utah

758 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Robert C. LARGE, Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Howard Trucking of Utah, Inc., and/or
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah
pnd the Second Injury Fund, Defendants.

Jack C. Helgesen (argued), Helgesen &
Waterfall, Ogden, for plaintiff.
James R. Black (argued), Wendy B.
Moseley, Black & Moore, Salt Lake City,
for defendants.
Barbara Elicerio, Legal Counsel, Industrial Com'n, Salt Lake City, for Industrial
Com'n of Utah.

No. 870437-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.

Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS
and DAVIDSON, JJ.

Aug. 3, 1988.
OPINION
Plaintiff was injured when applying
for job and sought permanent total disability benefits for his injury. The Industrial
Commission denied him benefits, and plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Greenwood, J., held that (1) finding that
injury sustained while applying for job was
not the medical cause of plaintiffs permanent total disability status was supported
by substantial evidence, and (2) claimant
was not entitled to disability benefits, since
his disability was the result of preexisting
conditions and not an industrial accident
Affirmed.
1. Workers' Compensation «»6
Proximate cause analysis primarily
used in tort law and involving analysis of
foreseeability, negligence and intervening
causes, is not appropriate in workers' compensation cases.
2. Workers' Compensation <s»1533
Finding that worker's back injury sustained during job application process, upon
stepping off truck, was not medical cause
of worker's permanent total disability status was supported by substantial evidence,
which indicated that worker had sustained
prior back injury, had difficulty walking
due to obesity, and lacked transferable job
skills.
3. Workers' Compensation <3=»554
Where a disability is the result of
preexisting conditions and not an industrial
accident, a claimant is not entitled to disability benefits.

GREENWOOD, Judge:
Robert C. Large appeals an Industrial
Commission order which denied him permanent total disability benefits. We affirm.
On March 25, 1985, Large applied for a
job as a truck driver with Howard Trucking. For about two and one-half years
before applying for the job, Large was
self-employed. Prior to that time, he had
been a truck driver for forty years.
As part of the job application process,
Large was required to take a driving test.
He climbed into a truck but discovered the
truck's clutch was not working properly.
As Large stepped out of the truck, he
slipped and fell on his back. At the time of
the accident, Large was sixty-one years
old, about six feet two and one-half inches
tall and weighed 376 pounds. He was
transported to Dixie Medical Center where
X-rays were taken. The X-rays did not
reveal a fracture, and the emergency room
physician prescribed twenty-four hours bed
rest Large drove to his home in Phoenix,
Arizona the following day and made an
appointment with Dr. Delbridge, an osteopathic physician. Dr. Delbridge had seen
Large six months earlier and had noted at
that time that Large's past history included
back problems. Dr. Delbridge examined
Large and diagnosed his condition as acute
lumbosacral sprain and arthritis and fibrositis of the lumbosacral spine. Dr. Delbridge stated that Large had difficulty
walking due to his weight and back injuries
and that, in his opinion, Large was unem-

LARGE v. INDUSTR VL COM'N OF UTAH
Cite as 758 P.2d <

ployable but might be trainable for work
he could perform while sitting. In April
1985, Dr. Ditchek examined Large and stated that "[rjeactive sclerosis is present and
suggests that this may be of some age, but
the possibility of new compression superimposed on old changes must be considered."
In December 1985, Large saw Dr. Robert
S. Barbosa who reported that Large's Xrays revealed evidence of advanced arthrosis and a suggestion of a compression fracture. Dr. Barbosa attributed 5% of
Large's disability to his previous injury and
5% to the present injury. Dr. Barbosa also
recommended that Large undergo a CT
scan to determine the extent of the fracture and if it extended into the spinal canal.
On April 22,1986, an Administrative Law
Judge (A.LJ.) held a hearing on Large's
application for temporary benefits. After
the hearing, the A.LJ. wrote to Dr. Barbosa and asked if the 10% permanent physical
impairment was attributable to the March
25, 1985 injury, if that injury aggravated
Large's pre-existing condition and what
percentage impairment rating he would assign to Large's condition prior to March 25,
1985. Dr. Barbosa responded, stating:
At this point, to answer your 4 questions,
I feel that the fall in March directly
aggravated the patient's preexisting condition, although, according to his testimony he was quite active. The patient also
has a 10% permanent physical impairment judging from his previous laminectomy surgery which certainly contributes
to what I feel is now a permanent physical impairment since the patient does
have a less of strength, especially of the
right lower extremity, rather severe discomfort extending from the lumbar
spine. I would give it approximately 5%
due to the patient's previous lumbar surgery, performed in 1953. This surgery
was done for herniated lumbar disc.
Based on this letter and the medical reports submitted at the hearing, the A.LJ.
entered findings of fact and conclusions of
law in September 1986 awarding Large
temporary total disability benefits. Specifically, the A.LJ. found that some of Large's
1. This section governs procedures and payments
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impairment related to an earlier back injury Large sustained in 1953 and that further
medical work was needed to determine the
relationship between the present and the
prior injury. The A.LJ. also stated that
even though no Utah case addressed
whether workers' compensation should cover those injured during a "try-out" period,
the statute should be construed liberally in
favor of coverage. Neither party appealed
the award of temporary total disability benefits.
In April 1987, Large requested permanent total disability benefits. Attached to
his request was a medical report prepared
by Dr. David Plone. The report, based on
an X-ray examination, noted moderate degenerative changes throughout the lumbar
spine, facet joint hypertrophy and arthritic
disease. Further, the report stated, "There
is compression of the superior vertebral
body plate of L3, but this appears to be an
old compression fracture." Without holding a further hearing, the A.LJ. entered
supplemental findings and conclusions,
stating that Large had a 10% disability, 5%
attributable to the 1953 injury and 5% attributable to the 1985 injury. The A.LJ.
also stated that although Large was an
employee for purposes of temporary total
and permanent partial disability, he was
not an employee for purposes of permanent
total disability. The A.LJ. then found that
Large's age, obesity, lack of transferrable
skills and prior back surgery constituted
the proximate or dominant cause of his
disability. The A.LJ. concluded that Large
was entitled to permanent partial disability
benefits but not permanent total disability
benefits because the proximate or dominant cause of his unemployability was not
the March 25, 1985 accident Large subsequently filed a motion for review, which
the Industrial Commission denied. The
Commission noted that the only issue on
review was whether Large was entitled to
permanent total disability benefits and
agreed with the A.LJ. that Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-67 (1985)1 implies a causal connection between the injury and the permanent
total disability. The Commission further
for permanent total disability.
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stated, "The concept of proximate cause
serves the purpose of allowing those whose
disabilities are truly the result of the industrial injury to be properly compensated."
This appeal followed.
[1] On appeal, Large claims that the
Commission erred in finding that factors
other than the 1985 accident were the proximate or dominant cause of his permanent
total disability, and concluding, as a result
of that finding, that he was not entitled to
permanent total disability benefits. We
agree that a "proximate cause" analysis, as
that term is commonly used, is not appropriate in workers' compensation cases.
Proximate cause is used primarily in tort
law and involves analysis of foreseeability,
negligence and intervening causes. These
factors are not present in the statutory
workers' compensation system, which excludes consideration of fault. A. Larson, 1
Workmen's Compensation Law § 6.60
(1985).
Although proximate cause is not an appropriate standard, the Utah Supreme
Court has, nevertheless, required proof of
a causal relationship as a prerequisite to
awarding workers' compensation benefits.
Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15
(Utah 1986). In Allen, the Utah Supreme
Court interpreted Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-45 (1986)2, and explained that "by
accident arising out of or in the course of
employment" requires: (1) proof that the
injury occurred "by accident"; and (2)
proof of a causal connection between the
accident and the activities or exertions required in the workplace. Id. at 18. In
analyzing the causal connection, the Court
adopted a two-part test which requires a
claimant to establish legal cause and medical cause. Under the legal cause test "a
claimant with a preexisting condition must
show that the employment contributed
something substantial to increase the risk
he already faced in everyday life because
of his condition." Id. at 27. Further, under the medical cause test, the claimant
must prove "the disability is medically the
2. The statute provides that "Every employee ...
who is injured ... by accident arising out of or
in the course of his employment ... shall be

result of an exertion or injury that occurred during a work-related activity." Id.
at 26. The standard of proof for causation
is by a preponderance of the evidence. Id
at 23. In Hodges v. Western Piling &
Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986), the
Court considered an Industrial Commission
determination which awarded permanent
partial disability benefits but denied permanent total disability benefits to a sixtyeight year old worker who injured his arm
in an industrial accident The Court affirmed, finding that "[w]hile it is unquestioned that the medical panel found petitioner to be one hundred percent physically
impaired, the panel also found that the
total impairment was due to the onset of
severe arthritic problems." Id. at 721.
The petitioner had a prior asymptomatic
arthritic condition which flared up after the
accident, but which was found to have no
causal relationship to the industrial accident. Professor Larson has also observed
that there is a distinction "between a preexisting disability that independently produces all or part of the final disability, and
a pre-existing condition that in some way
combines with or is acted upon by the
industrial injury." A. Larson, 2 Workmen's Compensation Law § 59.22(b) (1987).
Therefore, a claimant for permanent total
disability benefits must prove medically
that his disability was caused by an industrial accident
[2] The critical inquiry in this case,
therefore, is whether the Commission's decision should be affirmed because Large
did not prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the industrial accident was
the medical cause of his disability. In reviewing the Industrial Commission's factual findings, we will not disturb those findings unless they are " 'arbitrary and capricious,' or 'wholly without cause,' or 'contrary to the one [inevitable] conclusion
from the evidence,' or 'without any substantial evidence to support them.'" Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237, 238
(Utah 1987) (quoting Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury "
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Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1981)).
The medical reports in this case indicate
that prior to the accident Large had back
problems relating to a 1953 injury and herniated lumbar disc surgery. In addition,
Dr. Delbridge's letter stated that Large
had difficulty walking due to his weight
and back injuries. Dr. Barbosa's medical
report stated that Large's X-rays suggested
a compression fracture but that a CT scan
was required to determine the extent of the
fracture. Subsequently, Dr. Plone stated
that the compression fracture "appears to
be an old compression fracture." Although the Industrial Commission erroneously applied the proximate cause test rather than the causation test articulated in
Allen and Hodges, we find substantial evidence in the record to support a finding
that the 1985 injury was not the medical
cause of Large's permanent total disability
status and that Large's age, obesity, lack
of transferable skills and prior back surgery resulted in his disability.
Large also asserts that the A.LJ. erred
in finding that he was not an employee for
purposes of permanent total disability benefits. However, the A.LJ.'s findings of fact
and conclusions of law and the Commission's denial of the motion for review are
based on the inadequate causal link between the disability and the injury and not
on Large's employee status. Therefore,
the issue of whether Large was injured "in
the course of his employment," while performing "try-out" tasks, is not before us
and is not addressed in this opinion.
[3] Finally, Large claims that he is entitled to permanent total disability benefits
under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 (1985)
because the accident aggravated his pre-ex3. The version of section 35-1-69 which was in
effect in 1985 when Large was injured stated:
If any employee who has previously incurred
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury
... sustains an industrial injury for which
either compensation or medical care, or both,
is provided by this chapter that results in
permanent incapacity which is substantially
greater than he would have incurred if he had
not had the pre-existing incapacity, or which
aggravates or is aggravated by such pre-existing incapacity, compensation shall be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries, but
the liability of the employer for such compen-

isting injury.3 We disagree. Section 35-169 determines the apportionment of compensation between the Second Injury Fund
and the employer or its insurance carrier
and does not address entitlement to permanent total disability benefits. Entitlement
to benefits is a prerequisite to consideration of apportionment Where the disability is the result of pre-existing conditions
and not an industrial accident, a claimant is
not entitled to disability benefits.
Affirmed.

BILLINGS and DAVIDSON, JJ.,
concur.
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Sharon L. HEATON, Plaintiff,
v.
SECOND INJURY FUND, Defendant
No. 870336-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Aug. 3, 1988.
Certiorari Denied Sept 22,1988.
Injured worker petitioned for judicial
review of decision of the Industrial Commission that worker's permanent total disability benefit should commence only on
date of medical confirmation of worker's
disability. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that (1) Industrial Commissation ... shall be for the industrial injury
only. The remainder shall be paid out of the
Second Injury Fund
The statute also provides that any aggravation
of a pre-existing condition shall be deemed "substantially greater." Recently, section 35-1-69
was repealed and reenacted. Under the current
version of section 35-1-69, the test for apportioning liability for compensation is not the
"substantially greater" test Instead, the statute
requires a 10% pre-existing whole person permanent impairment before liability for compensation is apportioned.

